The question of whether China can rejuvenate its economic vigor has become a topic of intense debate among global economic experts and policymakers.
Recently, a colloquium titled “Who killed the Chinese economy,” hosted by Foreign Affairs and the Peterson Institute for International Economics, brought this discussion into the limelight.
The colloquium, teeming with hyperbolic flair, might suggest an overly pessimistic view of China’s economy. However, beneath the surface of this dramatic portrayal lies a complex, multifaceted scenario about China’s economic future.
Amidst varying opinions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has projected a growth forecast of 5.4% for China in 2023, while long-term analyses, like those from Financial Times’ Martin Wolf, caution against prematurely declaring “peak China.”
Diving Into the Real Estate Quagmire
A critical aspect of China’s economic challenge is its real estate sector, which has historically been a colossal component of its economic framework. A research paper by Sheng Zhongming in May highlighted the staggering impact of a downturn in real estate activities.
It revealed that a permanent slump in real estate, defined as sustaining the current sales level of Rmb13tn/year ($1.8tn), would result in a reduction of public sector revenues by Rmb3.6tn.
This drastic change, amounting to 3 to 4% of the GDP, would predominantly impact local government budgets, which constituted two-thirds of the overall fiscal revenue in 2021.
Such a significant revenue loss, approximately 15%, along with an equivalent decrease in available financing, could lead to substantial disruption in the Chinese economy.
Rebalancing the Economy: Structural and Political Perspectives
The debate on China’s economic trajectory involves two main perspectives: political and structural.
The colloquium, responding to Adam Posen’s analysis of China’s “economic long Covid,” presented views from Posen and China experts Zongyuan Zoe Liu and Michael Pettis.
A key consensus is the need for private domestic demand, especially consumer demand, to play a larger role in China’s economy. This shift is necessitated by the diminishing viability of export-driven growth and the inefficiency of state-led investments.
Posen attributes the decline in Chinese growth to arbitrary government interference, particularly during and post-pandemic.
Conversely, Liu and Pettis offer more structuralist analyses, pointing to an economic and institutional structure that became obsolete decades ago and failed to evolve.
Posen’s view implies that restructuring debt and fiscal stimulus could be effective, whereas the structuralist perspective suggests a deeper issue, where additional income in private hands might not translate into increased spending due to a lack of confidence in government policies and investment safety.
Addressing these challenges requires innovative strategies. One approach could involve significant wealth transfers to the poorest, potentially stimulating spending among those with a higher propensity to consume.
Additionally, wealth redistribution, complemented by government initiatives such as subsidies for better housing, could lead to more equitable economic growth.
Another strategy is direct fiscal spending, funded through taxes, to increase demand by focusing on public services for the poor.
In essence, the revitalization of China’s economy may hinge on the development of a welfare state, resembling a “Chinese economy with European characteristics.”
This would involve a shift in national resources to benefit the poorest citizens, necessitating institutional and political changes to address the interests and voices of the less affluent.
The path to China’s economic resurgence is complex and multidimensional, requiring a balanced approach that addresses both structural and political challenges.
As the global economy watches, the decisions and actions of Chinese policymakers in the coming years will be pivotal in determining the trajectory of one of the world’s largest economies.
