America has quietly redefined its role in the international economic sphere, a change that carries profound implications not only for the world economy but also for the intricate web of global alliances.
As America formulates its new blueprint for international economic engagement, the primary concern appears to be strategic competition with China.
America’s Dual-Purpose Industrial Policy
The underpinning ideology of this shift was laid bare by Jake Sullivan, President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, during his address on April 27.
It’s evident that the new philosophy is designed to not only address the competitive landscape with China but to also weave domestic and international policy goals into a cohesive and holistic narrative.
America’s revitalization plan is heavily centered on the development of a strategic industrial policy, which, if executed as envisioned, promises to reenergize the middle class and fortify democracy domestically.
At the same time, this policy aims to address global climate change issues and help America secure a lasting technological advantage over its Eastern competitor.
However, this dramatic policy change has stirred apprehension among America’s allies who perceive a notable absence in this strategy: consideration of foreign interests.
A significant point of contention is the proposed billions in subsidies to America’s industrial and clean technology sectors outlined in the Inflation Reduction Act. Concerns linger that such vast domestic support could disadvantage producers and workers in Europe and Asia.
International Trade and Climate Change: America Leads the Charge
American officials have quickly dismissed such apprehensions, citing Sullivan’s consistent acknowledgment of Western allies’ interests and those of the global south in his discourse.
Furthermore, they argue, America’s newfound resolve to confront climate change is a commitment that warrants global applause.
Sullivan further clarifies that the push for “de-risking” isn’t a move to eliminate China from global supply chains but rather to foster a world where critical products are sourced from multiple regions.
In other words, this policy does not demand that China stop building iPhones or producing solar panels, but it encourages other countries to do so as well.
During the recent G7 meeting in Hiroshima, Sullivan successfully communicated this new consensus from Washington, securing acknowledgment of America’s green subsidies plan and fostering an agreement to similar strategies.
Consequently, Sullivan argues, the quest for clean energy will soon morph into a shared endeavor rather than a potential source of international tension.
Despite these efforts, a palpable sense of unease persists among American allies, especially concerning the likelihood of America implementing measures aimed at China that its partners would then be compelled to adopt.
Lawrence Wong, Singapore’s deputy prime minister, cautioned against excessive “de-risking”, warning that it might result in a more fragmented, decoupled global economy.
Other allies are exploring ways to navigate the “panda problem,” the potential for exclusion if the US-EU relationship becomes the de facto standard for the global west. A suggested solution is to give the G7 a formal role in formulating new rules for the global economy.
With geopolitical concerns looming, such as Russia’s aggressive actions near the EU borders and China’s rising threat in Asia, America’s allies are treading cautiously, despite their reservations about the new economic approach.
Now, it seems, is not the time for a heated debate with the US, but rather a time for cooperation and strategic alignment in these uncertain times.
